

NOTE: Dr. Lundahl requests that researchers do not directly quote from his oral history without his consent.

PREFACE

The following oral history memoir is the result of ten tape-recorded interviews with Dr. Arthur C. Lundahl. The interviews were conducted for the Columbia University Oral History Research Office by Peter Jessup in Dr. Lundahl's home in Bethesda, Maryland during the period between April 8 to October 8, 1981.

Dr. Lundahl has reviewed the transcripts, making only minor corrections and emendations. The reader should bear in mind that he or she is reading a verbatim transcript of spoken, rather than written, prose.

Interview with Arthur Lundahl
Bethesda, Md.

by Peter Jessup
1 July 1981

Q: ... you are about to enter one of the more interesting phases of your life --

Dr. Lundahl: Well, it certainly was, Peter. CIA had never had any photo intelligence activity before I arrived. I found that out for myself by looking around the place. I opened many doors and entered many areas, and occasionally there would be a chap sitting there with a large Sherlock Holmes magnifying glass, looking at some kind of a small formatted picture, trying to form some opinions, but that was the only sign of an instrumented organized photo interpretation procedure.

So when I arrived and my operation got under way, I was immediately inundated with requirements for services from the total agency, but mostly from the clandestine services, where they had infinite numbers of problems about intervisibility, locations of devices, picking of the best trafficability routes between areas and the like.

And so, with my small cadre of 13 people, in K building under very very primitive conditions with minimal equipment,

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[redacted] very high quality, and that was going to be the start of the next era after the U-2. [redacted] Again, we were deeply involved because we had earned our spurs in the age of the U-2. Now we were expected to do it one better, and come on with an even higher level of performance, in the age of satellites. [redacted]

We kept track of what NASA was doing on a separate track of its own in the use of satellites for earth resources purposes. These were not intelligence satellites. These were satellites of lower resolution that flew on near polar orbits and told much about vegetation, ground water supply, and forests and things like that. But we knew from our experience how well the long focal length cameras could perform with high resolution films, and there was no doubt in our minds that they could succeed and probably improve upon the quality that the U-2 had been achieving.

But there was still a little bit of history to go, and through '61 and then coming to the fall of '62, we had been very much concerned about the events in Cuba. The Russians had put an awful lot of armor in there, including advanced fighters and guided missiles, PT boats and there were various kinds of tanks and sophisticated equipment-- much more than you'd need for the defense of cane fields or something like that, and something certainly was afoot down there, and so we were looking to try to find out what it was. And finally --

Q: -- it wasn't any sudden discovery, it was a gradual --

Lundahl: Oh, gradually. No, we were looking for months. We were trying to

figure out where and what it was. Many many conjectures -- and finally on the 14th of October, 1962, the U-2 passed over San Cristobal, and it was then that we were quite clear in our minds what was going on, that medium range ballistic missiles were going in, and I immediately got on the secure line to inform Ray Cline, who was then the DDI, and he talked to General Marshall Carter, who was in the chair because Mr. ^{McCormick} [REDACTED] was in California at the time, and we were instructed to have our materials ready for a pre pre briefing the following morning, following which [REDACTED] I had to be at the White House.

But the first briefing was over at CIA headquarters, and a great number of my contemporaries were absolutely incredulous about this going on, because I think the national estimate was very dubious about [REDACTED] the Russians ever doing such a thing as that.

All the people who needed to know were there. Then I went from there to a pre-briefing at the White House, in which one of the pocket Cabinet groups was there, that is McNamara, Bobby Kennedy and [REDACTED] C. [REDACTED] Douglas Dillon and Roswell Gilpatric and that group of men. [REDACTED] I was seeking to show [REDACTED] just exactly what the Russians were doing at San Cristobal. [REDACTED] We had barely finished that when the buzzer rang and JFK himself was ready for the story.

We trooped up there and I went through my story with him, and the President was at first unbelieving. He was sitting down. I was leaning over his right shoulder pointing at these things, and he turned and looked up at me and he said, "Are you sure?"

And I said, "Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything. I think you might agree that we have not misled you on any of the subjects to date that we have briefed you on here."

He said, "All right, I just wanted to make sure. You are convinced?"

I said, "Yes. I am convinced that's what it is."

In later discussions I pointed out, it's possible to make large papier mache worlds and extensive dummy decoys and deceptions, but you can't conceal all the track activity and all the ~~other~~ other evidences which photo interpreters scan and search for in minute detail.

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Bethesda, Md.

by Peter Jessup
July 8, 1981

Q: Good afternoon. Here we are on a pretty warm day, and we were on a pretty warm topic . We were on the verge of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Lundahl: That's right. Well, as you may recall, Peter, I said that the mission that actually discovered the missiles in Cuba was flown on the 14th of October, 1962. Film came back to the country and was processed on the 15th, and late in the afternoon of the 15th we were looking at it; [REDACTED] I had informed the Deputy Director of Intelligence of CIA and the Director of this remarkable discovery of offensive medium range ballistic missiles going into Cuba. And there was of course a shocked disbelief. [REDACTED] I was told [REDACTED] continue to work through the night and be prepared to get to Langley at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 16th.

To
That we did. All my workers who were on the problem, I said, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Please make your excuses but don't leave this room, because we indeed might be sitting on the biggest story of our time. So without milling around with your contemporaries in car pools and what not, stay here and make your excuses, but work through the night, and

"we'll see if we can't find out the totality of this particular threat."

And we did. The following morning, after having had many big enlargements made, not only of San Cristobal but other places in Cuba where medium range ballistic missiles were going in, we went over to the Langley headquarters, and of course there was a shocking response there. Many ~~were~~ were almost disbelieving until they saw this evidence, including the Director of the Office of National Estimates and Current Intelligence and other people there. And after a very short discourse, ~~we~~ we had to leave the building because we had to get to the White House. We were due at McGeorge Bundy's office shortly before 9, for another pre-briefing, and it was a strange coincidence. We were leaving the building in a great rush. I was moving with Ray Cline and my courier, out into the main entrance at Langley, and through the front door at that moment were coming streams of intelligence officers from other countries. They were from England and from Canada and from Australia and from New Zealand and other friendly nations, because every four years they had what was called an Intelligence Methods Conference, and of course the receptionist was garbling it up, and she was telling another lady that the "Methodists" were having a conference there.

We knew better. As we were seeking to escape through the double doors going out, this stream of men debouching from a big bus ~~was filing~~ in, and of course they all had to stop, or many of them, to shake hands, to ask me how everything was going, to look at ~~what~~ I was carrying ^{the black bag}, wondering where I was

going, and it was kind of awkward at that moment, because the last thing in the world we wanted was to alert a world net as to what was happening in Cuba.

But we explained that we were going off on a briefing, that we would see them later in the day, and with due excuse and ^{soon} apology, we escaped, and we were over at the White House. McGeorge Bundy was always a wonderful responder to the photointelligence craft and product. He was always a very considerate man. He always asked whether we were getting any sleep yet, whether we were enjoying work as much as we always did and so forth.

We streamed in there in his office, and he had with him Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, C. Douglas Dillon, Robert ^{and} Kennedy, a number of others who were in the President's pocket Cabinet at that particular time. ^A We proceeded to show them the material that we had. There was of course the same shocking disbelief, but ^{they} ^{were} very quickly convinced of what was happening, and much discussion started as to the significance and the meaning and the implications and all the rest.

While we were so engaged, ^A the buzzer rang, and the President was ready for the entourage to stream into his office. We went up there, and he was of course extremely interested in the photography. He was sitting, and I laid the pictures, that were mounted on large pieces of heavy cardboard, about 4 feet by 3 feet, before him, and I was leaning over his right shoulder and with a pointer, showing him the various components of a missile firing setup, the

blast deflectors, the fueling trucks, the cherrypickers off to one side, the ready tents where the missiles were mated with their warheads, the special nuclear contingent with its vans that had separate controls on the release of nuclear warheads, and all the rest.

The President turned slowly in his chair and looked over his right shoulder at me, looked me straight in the eye and asked, "Are you sure of this ? "

I said to him very seriously, [REDACTED] "Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photointerpreter can be sure of anything, and I think you will agree we have not misled you on anything to date. "

He said, "No, that's right. I agree. "

Well, quickly all the people there -- and it was a large group, not only the folks downstairs but most of the National Security Advisors and so forth were there-- and they immediately, when finished with the pictures, dismissed us and proceeded to engage in discussions as to what they were going to do about this.

We left, and went back to our office. The President did order that the whole of the island of Cuba be covered as quickly as possible, certainly within the next seven days, and that the totality of the threat be summarized hopefully by the following weekend.

Well, we worked each day and I went back over there each day. Although the President wasn't there, the Pocket Cabinet was there, and Dean Rusk was the moderator of the meeting, which was held in the State Department. However, each day, ^{as I kept} [REDACTED] putting new pins and markers on the map, to show them where the additional MRBM sites were being constructed-- and indeed, the start of some Intermediate Range

it was clear that

Ballistic Missile sites, [REDACTED] the gravity of the situation was increasing rapidly, [REDACTED] Finally by about Saturday, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] after I finished the briefing in the morning, Robert Kennedy got on the telephone and called his brother, John F. Kennedy, in Chicago where he was campaigning, getting ready for the election. He said in [REDACTED] words to the effect that, "this is much too important now for you to be away, better leave the campaign to another time, better hurry back -- "

So at that moment in history, the President wrapped a heavy woolen scarf around his neck in Chicago, said he wasn't feeling well, that he had a heavy cold, and returned promptly to Washington, [REDACTED] There was scheduled a mass briefing for all who needed to know the following day, on Sunday morning. I guess that would have made it the 21st of October, '62. I was to be up there with [REDACTED] Dr. Ray Cline, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, at 11 o'clock.

There was a huge collection of people there, even people from yesteryear like Dean Acheson and others who were famous in other administrations, so that the whole bedroom of the President up there on the second floor was literally filled with the national security apparatus and associated advisors and consultants. [REDACTED] We went through the totality of the threat, as photography had showed it to us, and answered their questions. They [REDACTED] were all stunned. Nobody disbelieved but they were just stunned.

At [REDACTED] that moment, the President surprised me and pleased me very much. He got up and came over to where I had just

finished my briefing, and he shook hands with me, and he said ~~that~~, "I want you to convey to your organization, to your fellow workers, the gratitude of your President and the whole American people for this remarkable discovery which none of us had anticipated."

I, of course, was just overawed, and he shook hands with me, and that was my sign for dismissal. I'm bagging up my stuff, getting ready to go, and they're already starting to discuss what is to be done about this thing.. Hawks [REDACTED] suggesting mean things to be done, strikes and so forth.. Doves talking about the United Nations and things like that.

Well, I left, and went back [REDACTED] to my office. the President, of course, had to brief the high ranking people of the House and Senate, and at the same time, he had to make it very clear to our ^{Allied} leaders overseas [REDACTED] what was happening.

So [REDACTED] Automat Center was responsible for making up briefing packages of briefing boards; ^{my} one such package was despatched to Ottawa. Another one went to London. Another one went to Paris, and one went to Bonn, each with a selected high ranking agency officer, for the purpose of briefing the chief of state in each of those countries. Just before the President would make his great speech [REDACTED] ^{Radio-TV}, which I think was to take place on Monday night, October the 22nd, 1962.. It was going to be on all networks, TV, and of course word had already been passed to the leaders in both House and Senate, and they were streaming into Washington from fishing trips, from various vacations [REDACTED] ^{they} were on. Nobody knew

why, but the air in Washington was already becoming [REDACTED] electric, without even knowing why. People were coming in. There was much conjecture in the press. Lights were burning late in the State Department [REDACTED] our packages had been despatched overseas, and those briefings were conducted for the leaders of the states mentioned, just before the President went on the air.

He did go on the air, on national TV, and made his famous speech, in which he delineated what was happening in Cuba, and threw down a ringing declaration that an attack on any state in Latin America would be considered an attack upon the United States, and excoriated them for their perfidy in this and the Russians for supporting them. It was one of his great speeches. The headlines were large. The atmosphere of Washington, and probably every other big city, was [REDACTED] Housewives were hurrying into the supermarkets to buy up Crisco and paper products because they felt sure there would be some huge emergency, some rush. People were stocking their bomb shelters. People were laying in batteries for small radios. It was really a crisis situation.

Nobody knew exactly what was going to happen, but as you will recall, the decision that was agreed upon was a blockade of Cuba. [REDACTED] Of course we were tracking ships with aerial photography as they came into the area of Cuban waters, and the American Navy was now standing by [REDACTED]. There was no gunfire. These ships turned around and started to go back. There was much drama going on within the White House. The hot line was being extensively used between the President and his advisors and the Kremlin. And it was at this moment in history, after due reflection, that Khrushchev and his people thought it wiser that

they turn and withdraw, and so announced.

Now our tasks were ^{changed} after the President made his speech; the reconnaissance shifted from the high altitude U-2's to lower altitude Navy and Air Force jets, which, coming in at very low altitudes, ^{and} taking color pictures, enabled us to see additional details. Mind you, no additional discoveries. We had described and delineated the threat quite accurately. But now we were seeing other things that we hadn't seen before. Oh, such things as Russian units on the ground in Cuba would plant flower beds, and in the multicolored flowers would register their regimental insignia, or the type of battalion or unit or company it was. It was very very interesting, to be looking at this ground order of battle, reading it out of flower beds in Cuba. There were other very [redacted] humorous things which happened at that time. Sometimes the low altitude jets would fly over open topped latrines, and there you could look down in and see the number of people who were sitting and the number of people who were standing or coming or going.

I always had an interesting problem with President Kennedy describing the difference between occupied and unoccupied sites. As you all know, an unoccupied missile site is one that has been completely surveyed in and all the correlative details are there, so that on short notice a missile, a medium missile can be trucked in and set up over the geodetic marker, and with all the firing tables having been calculated and in order, the firing can proceed rapidly. At an occupied site of course, the missile is on its stand and ready within minutes to fire.

Well, when President Kennedy saw these very very humorous pictures of the open top latrines, he quickly acknowledged the

difference between occupied and unoccupied sites, and he laughed heartily. [redacted] It kind of broke the tension. I was very very pleased that I was able to bring him something that, even for a second, diverted him. He called in Henry Ford, who was walking down the passageway in the White House, and brought him in and let him look at these pictures, and they guffawed a little bit and then proceeded to talk seriously.

The Air Force and the Navy film were being processed in Florida at Navy facilities or at Air Force facilities, and then were being flown up to ^{our} building, to the Steuart Building, where we were located, and there we were getting loads of film in at any hour of the night or the day, ^{which} we were continuing to read. There [redacted] were very interesting problems there. There were differences, for example, between Russian Army tents and Cuban Army tents. There were differences in crates and packages. The ships that had come in had certain crates on the deck, and the shape of the crate and the size of the crate were very diagnostic. [redacted] From our earlier photo intelligence work, we knew very clearly that a MIG 21 type aircraft came out of ^{a certain} kind of crate, and so when you saw a similar crate going into Cuba, you could say, "Well, there are seven MIG 21's on the deck of this ship going in, and here is the evidence for it."

So that led to a great collection of hardware that came with diagnostic crates, [redacted] this led to the term "cratology" the photointerpreters had coined or had imposed upon them by their masters who wanted to know what the cratology had indicated.

Sometimes the objects were so big, they couldn't be crated up, like a huge steam roller or bulldozer or something like that, and it would be strapped down on the deck of a Russian ship coming in, and lattice work of wood would be laid upon it, as a shelter, and we got to know the diagnostic features of those. That became "shelterology";["] so we got into "tentology, " "cratology", "shelterology" and a great number of people were now becoming very very excited about photographic intelligence and what you could do and how timely and important it was, how much the nation depended upon it, and the like.

And of course, the action was getting very turbulent up in New York at the United Nations, where Adlai Stevenson then was our ambassador to the UN. [redacted] Adlai Stevenson called me at night, during the course of this week, and asked me to get up to New York right away, with a [redacted] large gamut of my pictures, for a picture display at a full meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.

I explained to him, ^{that} I'd love to come there but I couldn't; I was on continuous traffic, many times a day, ^{or night} into the White House, into Fulbright's office, into the Secretary of Defense's office, etc., moved around the town and there was no difference between day and night. We went on and on.

Q: Were these continually the same pictures ?

Lundahl: No, no, new ones were coming in all the time.

Q: Frequency was, daily ?

Lundahl: Oh yes. Yes. Stuff was coming in daily, and of course with Navy

and Air Force jets flying as well as U-2 at that time -- if you remember, one of the U-2's was shot down, and that added a great deal of tension to the picture at that moment, because --

Q:-- shot down by a missile ?

Lundahl: Shot down by a SAM II missile, yes, and there was a great deal of concern over what portent this had for the oncoming negotiations.

I explained to Ambassador Stevenson that I really couldn't come, I'd love to come, but if he would receive him I would send my deputy, who was a very distinguished engineer [redacted], David Stewart Parker, later Major General David Stewart Parker, and governor of Panama.

I asked him if I could send David Stewart Parker up there with a full collection of briefing materials, as well as bright colored tapes and strings and pins, so that they could cook up whatever kind of display ^{that} would suit the UN needs. And he was quite pleased with this. He was a very reasonable man, understood exactly. So David Parker went up there, and behind the scenes they put up a spectacular display of these pictures, with markers and pins and so forth, and then the debate began. These pictures were outside on a mobile type of carrier. ^{the doorway}

[redacted] Ambassador Valerian Zorin was the Soviet ambassador at that time, and he started a kind of a drawing disbelief, "Does anybody really know there are missiles in Cuba ? Is this something the United States is cooking up ?" and so forth, and at that moment in history, the materials on the mobile cart were unveiled, and Ambassador Stevenson made his famous speech saying certainly they were there, and asked him the

question again, "Do you deny that there are Soviet missiles there ? I'm prepared to wait here for your answer until hell freezes over."

That made the headlines in the daily papers that day. Well, Ambassador Zorin, [REDACTED] kind of bowed his head forward and put his hand over the top of his eyes like a visor, and concentrated his attention on papers on his desk and never looked up at the pictures.

But the combined assemblage was overawed and struck by this, and it had a tremendous effect. Other briefing packages had gone to the State Department and smaller sub-assemblies were being given to the ambassadors of most of the Latin American countries, and the OAS then had a meeting; and it was I think the only time in history that the US got a 23-0 in favor vote at the OAS, because they were all convinced of what the significance of the pictures was.

Meantime back in New York, David Parker moved the materials into the passageway, after the briefing, and then folks from all nations represented at the UN, moving back and forth along the passageways, [REDACTED], whoever they were, people wearing burnooses with strange hair-dos and peculiar sandals or barefoot or whatever it was, from wherever they came, shuffling down the halls, would stop and look at the pictures, and in their own languages talk to one another.

It was one of those rare moments in history where photography showed off its best as a languageless dimension of communication. Nobody needed the annotations or the seeing eye briefer. They all were interpreting and coming to the same conclusion, that it was a

significant threat to the South. So we earned a great deal of praise from the world at that time, for spreading the word to the decision makers, to our allies, to the United Nations, and maybe one of the best moments in all of history for a simultaneity or near simultaneity of delivery of the intelligence message, backed up by the evidence, so that all those who were going to be privy to the decision or going to comment on the decision had their moments with it and could approve it.

It earned the US a tremendous amount of respect and a tremendous amount of good will on a global scale at that time, for cutting in so many people so widely and so early in the process.

Meantime --

Q: What is your opinion -- if there were no overhead reconnaissance and nothing had been detected for a whole year -- ?

Lundahl: Well, the missiles would have been ready to fire in a very short period of time. The [REDACTED] Range Ballistic Missiles, in a matter of hours or days at the most, ^{from the time}, ^{were}, the first ones detected. The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, ^{would have been able to}, ^{reach way up} all the way across the United States, except the northwest corner of the state of Washington. ^{These IRBM's} [REDACTED] were a few months off in their readiness, because a lot of the cement had to be poured ^{along with} [REDACTED] heavier construction to support the heavier missiles.

I don't know what would have happened. It seems like, the ^{might have} ^{that} way Khrushchev looked at it, ^A most of our alerting, distant early warning line and so forth, were concentrated to the North, ^{and here he} was coming to the soft underbelly, to the South.

And whether he would have fired them in a surprise attack or not, is unknown. I somehow rather have my doubts that he would have. I have a feeling that, when they were all in place, if they had been undetected and were all ready to fire, that the Soviets might have made some pronouncement ^{or demands} about withdrawing our missiley from Europe or giving up on this or that issue, some kind of a quid pro quo, in return for which they would promise not to fire or withdraw. I can't believe that they were aiming for a surprise attack. They certainly chose the right time to go in there, because it was rainy and the conditions for reconnaissance were not good, but it also made difficulties on the ground. The men laying heavy electrical cables had to tee them up to keep them out of the water. I'm sure the ground crews and the technicians, the Russians, had to work rapidly under difficult conditions. But exactly what would have taken place, I don't know.

I don't think there would have been a convincing disclosure to the President and to the American people without the overhead reconnaissance, because from other resources, we had hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of reportings about things going on in Cuba -- a peasant and his family might see some sections of sewer pipe moving up a road on a long truck, and they'd describe long cylindrical objects going into this area, and we would carefully search the photography and sure enough a new sewer would be going in here or some new gas lines. something like that. And there were dozens and dozens of reports from Cuba which had to be invalidated and proven to be wrong, even before this one came to pass.

So with that great haze of spurious information, I don't think that the true signal would have got through. Certainly not in as dramatic and convincing fashion as it did here. ~~the~~ I think this was probably one of the high points in the dramatic history of photographic intelligence-- how completely and convincingly it impressed so many people in such a short period of time, the decision makers particularly.

Well, at that moment, the film was flowing into Washington in great heavy loads. The Air Force had to fulfill its requirements and put a general, a major general to track and make sure that everything was coming along on schedule. He was Major General Robert Smith, who came from the Strategic Air Command, a very capable officer, ^a very ~~██████████~~ quick, decisive, brilliant man.

Bob Smith was a good friend of mine. I liked him very much. I had been out to SAC many times to visit him, and had been impressed by the spectacular displays out there. ~~████~~ Bob Smith, during this time, made many visits to the Steuart Building, and it was his custom to roar into the building and take off his jacket, and put a big cigar in his mouth, and my secretary put a big mug of coffee in front of him, and then he'd get to work; ~~████~~ two or three telephones at a time -- ^{would} ? he'd be calling Barksdale and other Air Force bases and checking tail numbers or arrival times and so forth , and literally for a few hours he used my office as his home away from home.

Well, this led to a funny story which I must tell you. In the middle of this critical week, after the President's speech, Mr. John McCone was now back from ~~██████████~~ California and he had said to me that Secretary McNamara would like to see first hand the evidence

on a certain detail of the missile erecting or supporting structure. I'm not sure what it was. Mr. McNamara and his staff would like to come over to this decrepit old Steuart Building, and I of course said, "Yes, indeed."

I said, "Mr. McCone, when will they be here. ? "

He said, "We'll be there at 11 o'clock. Oh, by the way, " he said, "McGeorge Bundy will be there and Robert Kennedy will be there," and he read off a list that was the Who's Who of Washington at that time.

So I quickly alerted my forces upstairs. They took some of the large film viewers with magnifying eye pieces and set them up and put the film up in parallel , at at least seven different stations.

Q: This would be simultaneous ?

Lundahl: Simultaneous, right, so simultaneously different groups --

Q: Was that a new trick in those days ?

Lundahl: No, but maybe people hadn't done it..I wanted them all to talk in the same language at the same time, and it was set up; ^{for a while} At the appointed hour, the big black limousines pulled up the street and these distinguished people were slightly distraught to see the nature of this downtrodden building -- the trash in the streets, the tawdry neighborhood and all that went therewith -- but they ^{so} streamed into the building, and of course the security doors

were held back, the elevators were held, and they streamed upstairs, and in less time than it takes to tell it, all of these seven duty stations were manned, and one of my experienced photo-interpreters was standing beside each station with an electric light pointer and describing to this principal what it was he was looking at.

But mind you, the principal, whoever he'd be, like Mr. McNamara, was sitting down looking through a large elaborate magnifying set of eye pieces, and the room is darkened. The light is coming from beneath the film, up through it, and it looks like a big working environment. It's very quiet in there. Nobody's saying much with all of this brass around.

At this moment in history, the door opens up, and Bob Smith bounds in. Nobody had a chance downstairs to tell him who was there and what was going on. Bob Smith bounds in, minus jacket, shirt ^{tie} --

Q: -- he's a major general --

Lundahl: Major general, yes. His ^{Collar} is open, his tie knot is pulled down, he has a big cigar in his mouth and he's holding a big mug of coffee in his hands. The door bursts open and he gets at least seven steps into the room, and he stops. Dead in his tracks. Looking around at this panoply of Who's Who in America. And he quickly jerked his head to one side, ^{beckoning me to come over.} I was not briefing at that moment, so I got up and followed him over to a little partition, and he said, to me, in his usual Bob Smith fashion, ^{with a} marvelous sense of humor; he said, "God, are things that bad that all

these fellows are working here now too ?

I said, "Hardly, Bob. They're all here to see something. Why don't you secure your tie? Don't bother about your jacket, but come on in." So I introduced him to Mr. McNamara and to McGeorge Bundy and the other great names of the time, and then he of course had a chance to tell them about the Air Force part in the film processing and resupply that was coming in there.

After about three-quarters of an hour, Mr. McNamara and his party seemed to be satisfied, and their questions were answered and they left, and Mr. McCone was relatively pleased that his point had been accomplished.

I always held my breath because I was never quite sure exactly what other ~~subjects~~ were under debate at that point either, but we knew about the pictures and we knew about the details, and that's all apparently what they had to know.

Q: There were certain tensions between McCone and McNamara ?

Lundahl: There could have been, yes. I think one of the things that I might have mentioned is that when we were producing photographic intelligence reportings, we always had to try to make the races come out as close to ties as we could. I found out, if we were a half step late or fast in either direction, we generated problems. So in this flight, I used to leave ^{w,th} one courier to depart for Mr. McCone's residence on Whitehaven St. N.W. about 15 minutes before the equivalent courier with materials would leave for the Pentagon. And we had it worked out just right, so that about the time Mr. McNamara was being

bombed with the latest significant facts, Mr. McCone was also being bombed by the significant facts, and if one or the other grabbed the telephone and was going to talk to the other, he always got the voice at the other end saying, "Yes, I know about that."

I was there one time up in Mr. McCone's bedroom, no less. He had finished dressing and I was briefing beside his bed, laying the pictures out, watching the lighted buttons on his telephone, and I just finished the briefing when two or three of the lights went on, and sure enough it was Roswell Giapatic, that time, and he said, "Sure, I know about that, Roz. I know all about that."

But it was that close -- and we recognized very early in the game that we had to keep the Pentagon and CIA as close to neck and neck as possible, if we wanted to keep difficulties from happening, and we were quite successful at it.

There were other briefings, though, that were stickier. I'll get into those a little bit later here. The crisis is all history now. The Russians turned and took their ships back, and we tracked those ships as completely as we could, as to where they were going, into the Soviet Union. We also kept accurate track of the dismantling of the missile sites down there in Cuba. We saw them cracking up the concrete under the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile pads. We saw them lowering other missiles, and we'd see the huge amount of equipment which was snaking its way to the ports, and the Russian ships were there, loading up, and it tickled us because, as the Russian ships would leave the myriads of ports in Cuba, they left the ends of the crates off, so

that our low flying reconnaissance aircraft taking pictures latterally could look into the crates and see that there were indeed missiles in there.

It took quite a bit of time to get all this stuff out.

Q: That was part of the agreement .

Lundahl: Yes .

Q: To take everything out.

Lundahl: Apparently. I wasn't privy to all of the agreed upon facts, but apparently that was it. There was one sticky point. The Russians had some bomber type aircraft, IL 28's in there, and the US considered those as strategic threats and wanted them out of there as well, and there was some difficulty, because some of those had just finished being assembled, and I don't know whether the Cubans wanted to keep them or what, but finally, after I think Mr. McCloy, who was the famous US negotiator, got into this drama, with Mr. McCone and the Defense Department, I think that it finally got squared away and withdrawn.

Now the country was breathing easier and it was about the 26th now of October. I certainly was breathing easier. I was getting some sleep for a change, but for almost ten days in there, I had very little sleep, cat naps here and there, and I had to go off and do all kinds of local briefings.

For example, the Vice President, Lyndon Johnson then, was not in the country at the time the discovery was made. He had been in the

Philippines. And so when he returned, this was I think on Sunday the 21st of October, Mr. McCone directed me to be at his house up in the Perle Mesta Chateau up in Northwest Washington [REDACTED], at 10 o'clock at night, and ^{the Vice President} ~~he~~ was just back. [REDACTED] My courier and I were there. We knocked on this huge castle-like door, and we could hear myriads of high heels clacking and running on the inside, and I think there was Lynda Bird and Lady Bird and others, I'm not sure who it was, thinking perhaps it might have been a date or some expected visitor. -- when they saw us, and I identified myself, they said, "Oh yes. "

Lady Bird Johnson was an extremely nice lady. She said, "Yes, the Vice President's expecting you. He's having his dinner now. Won't you come in? "

We went in. It was a very comfortable house. There was a fire off to one side. It was very cozy.

Q: In Spring Valley?

Lundahl: Yes, over in there. And shortly thereafter, a Filipino type individual with a white coat and a small cart came forth with [REDACTED] many different bottles of spirits on it, and we were invited to have a drink. Of course I drank very little in my totality of experience, but this was the last place in the world I'd ever be caught with a drink in my hand, and we thanked Mrs. Johnson for her kindness and said, no, we'd not. She was a very perceptive person. She said, "Well, maybe a cup of coffee? "

We acknowledged that a cup of coffee would be good. So then another individual came with a very nice display of coffee. I know I was

so impressed with little kind of embroidered doilies lying on the saucer itself, under the cups, so if you spilled a little bit -- I had never seen that particular frill. But we had coffee, and shortly thereafter Lyndon Johnson came in.

I had known him extensively from his earlier days as the Majority Leader, and also as Vice President, and I liked him very much. He responded well. He asked good questions. There was no doubt in your mind about where he stood on any given issue, and he came in -- he ~~was~~, tired, and his shirt was kind of rumpled. His coat was off. His tie knot was pulled down. And he shook hands with me, and I asked him if he would like to wait to start this briefing until Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA, arrived, or whether he would like to proceed immediately.

Well, Lyndon Johnson, in his usual great fashion, said, "No, let's proceed immediately."

So I was well along in my story when Mr. McCone arrived, and there was really no need for him to ~~hear me~~ because he had heard me tell this story so many times and I never deviated from it, to total up the threat that was there, and it went extremely well.

Lyndon Johnson got hung up on one point, though, on visibility conditions up there over Cuba. In meteorological terms and military terms, they frequently talk about "CAVU conditions, "Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited. Now, there are times when the visibility on the ground is quite good, for playing golf or enjoying fun in the sun, but not good for reconnaissance -- there are high scattered clouds and

so forth, so in many of those days before the 14th of October, they were not CAVU conditions so there was no chance to get in there much before the day when we did get in there.

So I tried to explain to the Vice President the difference that visibility meant to a 70,000 foot high aircraft and people on the ground, and he quickly of course understood what I was talking about.

I guess close to 11:30 at night, we were dismissed, and Mr. McCone and the Vice President sat there talking about alternate courses of action, and we quickly secured our materials and left and went off to the ^{Stewart} building, because we couldn't take any of these materials home. They all had to go back in the vault.

About this same time too, I think Dwight Eisenhower, General Eisenhower, was back in the territory, and to bring him up to speed, which President John F. Kennedy wanted to have done, General Eisenhower went to Mr. McCone's house on Whitehaven St., and we conducted the briefing for him out there as well.

Generally speaking, General Eisenhower was kept pretty well posted on the status of reconnaissance, even after he left the White House. There was one moment when he returned, you may recall, when President John F. Kennedy had General Eisenhower there for lunch, and they walked around in the Rose Garden and looked at the various changes in the furniture and the decorations in the White House, and then after this lunch, they came back to the office of the President and I was privileged to have lunch that day at the White House, with

McGeorge Bundy. After the two seniors were back, I had to give them a briefing about the status of reconnaissance at the present time. These were exciting and interesting moments for me.

Well, the crisis was now pretty well over, but it certainly was electric in its time. As I would wait in the White House, the tension in the air seemed almost as thick as styrofoam. I could hear machines in other rooms, like teletype machines, rattling away, line after line after line, and then a pause, and I could hear some secretary tear the paper off, and then the clatter of the high heels as this person unseen would clatter into some other office -- a hasty telephone call -- and then a gaggle of people moving in another direction, and all the while you're sitting there, you're not sure whether World War III has just about started, or just what has happened, ^{and} the tension built up accordingly.

For all my briefings in the White House, I found out that the more senior you go in the government, the less likely they are to be able to see small details. So I had ^{plenty of} these large Sherlock Holmes type magnifying glasses with the black handle^A on them. I must have had two or three dozen with me, and I used to bring them along, so that whoever was seeking to look at some detail had a big magnifying glass to look at it.

And the secretaries in the White House were so grateful. They said, "You know, this is the first time we've been able to make out some of Mr. McGeorge Bundy's scrawl." They kept some magnifying glasses so they could see things they hadn't been able to see.

Well, on the fateful day when the ships turned and the crisis was over, the 26th or thereabouts--

Q:-- tell me this. Was the community relying almost 100percent on photographic intelligence, or was there some other source material which supported or contradicted , or were they pretty barren on agent reports, foreign diplomats' reports ? Was there anything else ? Did you get a certain amount of the flow of other material or wasn't there any ?

Lundahl : Well, I can't be precise in answering because I did not sit at the neck of the hour glass, to see it all flow through. I do know that with the intensity of interest, ^{growing} daily, [redacted] [redacted] in photography, it certainly must have been the major resource. But I wouldn't say it obviated all others. I'm sure there were agent reportings. I'm sure there were communication reportings or economic reportings or reportings from Europe and other places. But that mass assemblage and net assessment would be done by somebody at the CIA national security level, and they would of course be the ones who would be delivering those pieces to the President.

But I think I can safely say that the major ingredient and certainly by all odds the most important ingredient in the total jigsaw was the photography, because there, you had the means by which you could either confirm or deny some of the facts, so called facts, that we're being reported through the other media. And we had requirements [redacted] A to confirm or deny various things. So I felt that the

photography was the winner; as it provided somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of the military intelligence in World War II, here in a military situation in Cuba, it seemed like the percent that was coming from photography was going to be very very high.

^{Soviet ship}
Well, after the turnaround, and the crisis was over, you could feel the tension fall from people like heavy wet coats. There was laughter. Doors opened and closed. You could hear music from remote radios. There was not the staccato clatter of teletype machines. Everything seemed to fall into routines which were comfortable, and it was a great moment in Washington. The relief was everywhere, and you could see how relieved the President was. This thing was undoubtedly the high point of his short Presidency. He had handled it extremely well. He had excellent information to work with, but he used the information to excellent advantage, and we were just delighted.

As I used to tell my people -- and I had lots of good ones over there -- ^{I'd} far rather have some small role in the making of history than to sit on the 50 yard line watching it being made by somebody else, and for all intents and purposes, we had a small and maybe not so small fingerprint on history at that moment. And my people at the center were very witting of the fact. I tried very ~~hard~~ hard after all of my briefings -- two or three briefings with the President or with Fulbright or with McNamara or anybody -- when I'd get back, I would gather them together and report in detail their response to the graphic materials and the questions that were being raised and so forth, so the people in the building knew they were in the eye of history at that time, in the very eye of the storm, and that their

words and graphics were being hung upon , like at no moment in modern history. [REDACTED]

And ⁱⁿ the days that followed, many wonderful things happened. The President started to relax. He sometimes smoked big cigars. He was his usual genial jovial self, full of witticisms and ^{with a} wonderful sense of humor. [REDACTED] I used to keep going back there, ^{and} the follow-up of materials ^{moving out of} Cuba, and he became very much interested in photographic intelligence. He asked me, where did photointerpreters come from ? What kind of training do they get ? What schools in the country do that kind of training ? What can you afford to pay them on entry and what can they eventually hope to earn ?

These were wonderful times for me, born and raised almost in photointelligence, to be able to sit there with the President of the United States and tell him ⁱⁿ these things which he was extremely interested. [REDACTED] He said one time, "I certainly would like to come over to that building where you work. I don't know if they can work that out, but if they can, I'd like to come and see some of those machines and some of those procedures. "

So we kept our fingers crossed, but the press of circumstances didn't permit.

The President however did not forget the photointerpreters. He wrote a marvelous letter, over his signature, which acknowledged the great contribution that photography and photo intelligence had made in the discovery and in the accurate handling of the crisis. I had that letter duplicated and one copy inserted in the files of all of my principals who were involved in this thing, with a short note

appended by me, saying "Mr. so and so was part of the team to which the President is referring in this letter, " and of course that was great for morale. People were all excited.

The President also was greatly relieved and he had one of his aides go up to Tiffany's in New York and order up from Tiffany's a very very remarkable small item called "a crisis calendar. It was a plate of silver about 6 inches by 4 inches mounted on a piece of black wood, walnut, highly polished, and etched on the silver was the month of a calendar page of October of '62, with the dates 16 through 26 October in raised relief. And then on the top of the calendar would be, on the left hand corner, the initials of the recipient, then a space, then the initials of the President, JFK.

I don't know for sure but I think he had about 19 of these things prepared. One of them of course went to Jackie Kennedy, one of them to Mr. McNamara, one of them to Mr. McCone, one to each of those principals who had been with him in his Cabinet at that time .

Q: You don't mean Jackie, you mean Bobby ?

Lundahl: No, his wife, Jackie. She was his wife and of course stood by him in the stress of the time and so Jackie Kennedy -- Bobby of course too. Well, I was overjoyed and bowled over when I received one, and of course everybody in the center gathered around it, and they had it on display in the headquarters at Langley and [redacted] and everybody looked at it with great interest, ^a beautiful piece of history.

Then shortly thereafter, with this thing under my belt and now all the stuff pouring out in the newspapers about photo intelligence, and where this work was done and who was in charge of the work and how was it executed, how quickly did they move, how much did they know, and so forth -- my name had been splashed in papers all across the country, not only in newspapers but in the Congressional Record and various journals and magazines, and people I hadn't heard from for years and years and years were writing to me, from remote places in the country and the world, saying, "We were reading the such and such journal or hearing the such and such news, and we heard of you," and they were writing letters, even such ancient friends as Major General W.P.T. Hill, ~~the~~ Marine Corps Quartermaster General, wrote me a very nice letter, and I had other nice pieces from General Eisenhower and from Hubert Humphrey and from others, and there were pieces of editorials from various newspapers about the country about "Those vigilant ones who work while you sleep, "you know, that kind of thing, and it really got to be kind of embarrassing.

I put them all in a black kind of a scrap book which got to be about two to three inches thick and I couldn't squeeze any more stuff in, and then anybody in my lifetime who had had anything to do with me was also capitalizing on this, like my high school or the National Park Service where I had served as a United States Forest Ranger; one of their bulletins had a feature article in there denoting one of their men who was responsible for this particular thing. Well, it was embarrassing, to say the least, but very very enjoyable.

Toward the end of the year, Mr. McCone saw fit to submit my name, (because there was now so much known about me, and up to that time nobody even knew where I worked; they thought I still worked for the Navy) [REDACTED] as the CIA candidate for the National Civil Service League Award. As you know, the National Civil Service League picks ten winners each year out of [REDACTED] several million government workers. [REDACTED] Each agency, whichever it be, submits a candidate with a dossier, and a [REDACTED] very prime blue ribbon panel goes over [REDACTED] them, and they winnow [REDACTED] them down to the final ten; then [REDACTED] NCSL put^s on a huge banquet over at the Shoreham Hotel, and [REDACTED] Walter Cronkite [REDACTED] People like serve as^s the master of ceremonies. [REDACTED] All the Who's Who of Washington, the Senators and the Congressmen and the Cabinet people and the Defense Department people are there, and then they read the vitae on [REDACTED] each winner or she and he stands forth and receives [REDACTED] a reward; [REDACTED] there were some citations^s very nice stipends and a gold watch and the usual things that go with [REDACTED] them.

So it was a great moment for me, because my family now had a [REDACTED] very much clearer concept of just exactly how big this thing was that I was involved in. [REDACTED] My wife and my children and my mother-in-law and others [REDACTED] many were there, while my dear mother and dad in Chicago, [REDACTED] were being besieged by reporters out there who wanted to know where I went to school, [REDACTED] was I a good student, [REDACTED] did they have any pictures of me, [REDACTED] did I behave myself, and all of those kinds of things. My poor mother, my dad said, was jumping back and forth between door and telephone there for about four or five days while the story was at its peak.

[REDACTED] Many many lessons were learned from Cuba, and one lesson of course, was that a nation shall depend [REDACTED] very much on photograph^y as a source of intelligence, no matter where-from these photographs be taken; it's a prime source which can be used to evaluate other sources.

Q: Had there been, in your experience, any possible sort of -- like the Loch Ness monster-- things that had been photographed that had never been identified, that are a mystery yet? I remember, I don't know whether you were through there or not, but there was something in the Soviet Caspian, some kind of a ship or a plane -- ?

I know what

Lundahl: Yes, you're talking about -- it was a very [REDACTED] big plane, like Howard Hughes's Spruce Goose. It was known in our language as the Caspian Sea Monster. It was a huge plane which would move about, it never seemed to go very high, and then come back, and they would work on the engines and refurbish certain parts that had been broken or damaged and fly again, and there were many many conjectures as to what was the ultimate use it was intended for. Certainly it looked like it was meant for cargo and it certainly was meant to land on the sea.

To answer your question more generally, there were in their time quite a few puzzle problems, we called them, but we had an active file of unknowns, and as correlative data came in, from whatever the source was, or we got a better look at the object in a different light, or in color, or a different angle, or in a different stage of its

evolution, if it were being built, one after another these things were largely answered. So I think I can safely say today that the number of unknowns is ^A very small minority, and we have answered and put definite answers on most of the others.

Q: Would photo interpretation, overhead reconnaissance, -- were they or could they have been of use in predicting Mt. St. Helen (volcano eruption) ?

Lundahl: No, not yet. It's coming, but not yet. Volcano prediction is being worked on by scientists, and aerial photography is one of the media that they're using, so that if there's any bowing on any side, it can be measured. Also, if you can take infrared photography in addition to panchromatic or color film, along certain seams there may be increased amounts of heat which would manifest themselves on infrared film. ^G Geodetically, where you posted little mirrors and precise theodolite type of measuring things, distortions could indicate the arriving of diastrophic forces. But right yet they cannot precisely call the shots, when it's going to happen. There are vulcanologists now and others who are literally going out on a limb; for example, here in July of 1981 there are some big predictions of some enormous earthquakes going to take place in Peru within the next couple of months. But other scientists are quickly jumping to the fore saying, "No, you cannot say that yet with that definitiveness."

One day we might be able to, but not yet.

So, I'd say that, one day, I think the answer will be yes -- we'll do a better job than we're doing today. But the aircraft

will have to carry more than the conventional aerial camera with conventional film. You have to have a multisensing device, not only infrared but color and false color and various things that read out the changes in gravity and changes in magnetism, so when you get an assemblage of sensors reading the ground at the same time, you can get what we call a convergence or divergence of evidence. [redacted] I have a personal feeling that a day will come, I think they'll solve it on the ground first, the prediction, and then they'll extend the technology probably upward into space, but not at the present time. [redacted]

Well, Cuba is now past us. A new set to world affairs was taking place. It's 1963. And many many people are wondering about the lessons that we learned, and what can we do better next time.

And of course there were big political implications about Cuba. The party out of power might have guessed that somebody in power could have done a better job, could have detected it earlier. That led to some of those discussions [redacted] you [redacted] in there to detect this thing! [redacted] I saw some of that cropping up its head on the night of the President's speech on the [redacted], 22nd of October, '62. I had to go to give a briefing at the White House for the combined leadership of House and Senate, a huge group was in there, and I did my discourse on Cuba, ^{and} the totality of the threat. [redacted] The response was just amazing, from the various Senators who were disbelieving and uttering words -- I can remember Senator Smathers of Florida saying, "Why, that's right next to my home state, we never knew anything about that!"

And Senator Wylie of Wisconsin was desperately trying to keep up with the way the ball was bouncing around the room, and other Senators, Mike Mansfield firing questions in to this and that one, and somebody around the table, around the room, asked the question, "Could we have gotten in there to photograph this earlier than the 14th of October '62 ?"

You could immediately see what he was leading up to. And this was again that same question that I had spent time with Vice President Lyndon Johnson on -- the difference between CAVU conditions and just bright sunlight conditions.

Well, when you're dealing with a bunch of Senators and Congressmen^A in a discussion, I've long since found, they all talk at once, and whether they know any facts or the facts about the case or not is irrelevant. They'll fire off until they get tired. And then maybe if they fall back in their chairs, you can come forth with a few words of wisdom.

I was at that moment in history. They're all talking and storming up on this^A and that issue. I was watching President John F. Kennedy sitting at the end of the table. His eyes were down, looking down at the table, and he was drumming. He drummed with his fingers when he was sort of irritated. But at least he was letting the thing run itself off.

So at that moment in history, it was rather a big moment in history, with all the power makers and decision makers all in one room at one time, I let my eye wander around the room, from the President's left, past the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary

of Defense, on around the table, noting what each was doing at that moment in history. And as my eye darted from person to person to person to person, I finally came around to the short side of the table right across from the President, and there was Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and he was watching my eyes, because he was hearing this discourse and ^{remembering} his consternation the night before. As my eyes came to rest upon his, he leaned forward and with a great big slightly suppressed grin and a big Texas countenance, he gave an exaggerated wink and a nod of his head, as much to say, "We went over that one the other night, didn't we ? "

Well, it had a remarkable effect on me. It dropped some of the tension off me. I was very much at ease. Pretty soon they tired down, and the President got the baton back in my hands and I explained to them the case.

But now after the missile crisis is over, we're still moving around Washington doing postmortems, and there was one thing that I don't think Mr. McCone was too happy with. Robert McNamara decided to give a TV extravaganza, and he used as his photointerpreter a very fine man named John Hughes who used to be [redacted] working for me in the Steuart Building as a young Army captain. We liked him very much and he advanced rapidly, and the chief of staff of the Army took him over, and then when Mr. McNamara came in, he expropriated John Hughes.

[redacted] Now John Hughes is intelligence collection chief for the DIA.
[redacted] ^{McNamara} John Hughes did the briefing before a mass audience of reporters and others with a huge screen and it was televised. And as the various

Soviet military objects, the [redacted] objects were shown on the screen, why, John Hughes was accurately describing what they were, and how we knew about these things and so forth, and I may be wrong but I think the briefing lasted about two hours at that time.

I don't think Mr. McCone was too happy with this briefing, because there was a fair bit of insight into our intelligence methodology, indeed, how we thought and how we reasoned by analogy and how much we had learned. For example, from parades on May Day in Moscow, we learned about dimensions and objects, and then seeing the offloadings of crates for example in Egypt, and then correlating what came out of those crates and so forth. He never said anything to me about it but I don't think he was too happy.

I was moving around with Mr. McCone, and we were doing postmortems for these various committees, like the ^{the} Military Preparedness Committee, Senator Stennis's committee, and there again I had to make an interesting discourse for Senator Stennis on say, San Cristobal in Cuba, pointing out to him that of the sites there, when we made our detection, just the first site, was under construction, and as much as four or five days later, the fourth or fifth site was just being scratched out, so that if you flipped it over the other direction, if we had been there as little as say four or five days before the 14th of October of '62, there might have been nothing there at all, certainly nothing to attract our attention. I showed him how the ground looked shortly before and then shortly thereafter, and it was very dramatic, how they'd cut, slashed, burnt out trails, removed, moved stuff in, almost overnight.

Well, Senator Stennis really tickled me. I liked him very much, a wonderful gentleman, very kind and considerate and always full of Southern gentility and graciousness, and when I showed him this flip flop back and forth, how it looked five days later and how, having looked at it as early as five days earlier you would see nothing, he said in his inimitable Southern drawl, "That's just wonderful, Mr. Lundahl. I wish we could get these pictures in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, showing them before and then after, so the whole American people could see just what you told us today."

Then he started a bandwagon going. He said, "I think this committee owes Mr. McCone a wonderful congratulations on a job well done, timely and well delivered and convincing" and on and on like that.

Then once he started in, the bandwagon started rolling. Margaret Chase Smith got in and amened it, and Barry Goldwater got in and he amened it, and so everybody there was amening this speech.

I was standing there beside my easel waiting to go on, and Senator Scoop Jackson was sitting in the front row, and he reached out and took me by the arm and he pulled me slightly toward him, and I bent my head down to him and he said, "Why don't you come and sit down here next to me? They might go on for hours like that."

I said, "Well, Senator Jackson, thank you very much. I think I'm going to continue standing," because I've been with Mr. McCone a long long time, and the last thing I would have wanted was to be caught informal, guard down, uncaring. I would never drink. I would never smoke. I would never get into camaraderie and so forth. I was there to do a job, and when he was through with me, he'd tell me. I

wasn't there to make friends with anybody, much as I'd like to, and I was glad to have learned this lesson, because I think there were some people who didn't learn that lesson, and to their grief later on.

Mr. McCone was a marvelous man, a task master, an extremely capable person, and a very demanding person, and nothing that you did yesterday ~~could~~ convince him of the way he should feel about you today. You had to prove yourself every day. And that's exactly the way the intelligence business should work. There should be no free loaders and coasters. You have to do it every day. ~~MAN~~ I had enormous respect for him, and I felt very comfortable with Mr. McCone because he was extremely intelligent and he asked good questions, and he quickly grabbed at the magnitude, the significance of what you were talking about, and he had no hesitation whatsoever of getting right on the phone and calling the White House and saying, "I'd like to be over there right away to show you something.."

Now, no time before or no time after did I ever have such access to the White House. ^{During} ~~A~~ Mr. McCone's reign at CIA, I was there many many times, many many days, and so, the President got to know me better than I would ever have expected a President to know me, and he of course was a marvelous President to know -- this keen sense of humor, his wonderful Irish witticisms and so forth ~~.~~

Well, we were going about continuing our briefings, not only to the Senate and the House but over at the National Security Agency and the State Department and many other places, and about that time in history, a large postmortem was started, on the

whole intelligence structure of the United States -- its organization, its delineation, its functions, its corroborations, its resources, its results and so forth, and a very very strict report known as the Kirkpatrick Report was generated, and there were many many recommendations in that report.

One of those recommendations was that there should be established, as soon as possible, a National Photographic Interpretation Center. I felt completely vindicated now. All of this work, all of these years, the lesson^s in history had not been lost. My peers were reflecting on the facts. I was also very comfortable with it because I had been acting like a national center without charter, without portfolio, if you will, sharing with the whole intelligence community, seeking to serve well and [redacted] to earn praise and satisfaction wherever we went.

But now these recommendations were going to USIB, the United States Intelligence Board, for implementation and for decision.

Very soon they got into the discussion of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and at this moment in history, it seemed to me the Air Force was hoping to turn this whole thing around and to get a national center completely run by or controlled by the Air Force, where the Air Force felt the centering of reconnaissance within the United States should be. And it well might be today their decision. I don't know. It just was not so at that time. And so, the USIB started the debate, and it was -- there were extensive discussions ahead of time about this particular point, and our friends stood up for us. The Army -- I think it was General Wille^{TT}s at the

time -- said, "Well, we have been beautifully served by CIA, never better in history, and we'd like to see CIA continue to own and operate, the way it has been operating, a national center over at Lundahl's place in Project Automat."

And the Navy said, "Well, Lundahl established our photo-intelligence. He came over here and we liked the way it was run. We'd like to see a national center and we'd like to be represented in it too."

FBI and Treasury were non-voting. National Security Agency said they were [redacted] very happy at the way we were running it, and of course the agency wanted to run it. Air Force at that time said: no, we think we should run it. And there was the senior Air Force officer on the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time named General Breitweiser, a [redacted] very intelligent officer, and they had another twist in their thinking -- that maybe it should be run by the JCS with Air Force as the executive agent for the JCS. There were many variations but they couldn't come to any conclusions.

So there were three abortive meetings of USIB, and no decision. So the whole issue was raised to the National Security Council, and they went into it with extensive discussions of the problem, and finally, agreed , before President Eisenhower • A that there should be a national center.

I think the telling blow in this was the testimony of Professor George Kistiakowsky of Harvard. He was the President's science advisor, and he said to the President, when asked, that he thought that the agency had done a fine job. He had been in my center. We had briefed him many times. He thought we had young men who had bright ideas

we were careerists, we were growing with the field, we were going to be there for a long time, and he thought that this field demanded careerists, people with scientific backgrounds, who would ride with it right to the ultimate end of whatever it was going to become; whereas the military, bright as they might be and as good as they might be today, for military career purposes, they'd be rotated all the time. So you might get some excellent officers today but they're gone tomorrow. So his recommendation to the President was that CIA should run it.

So that's when the President said, "Well, that settles it. Ailian," "Ailian Dulles", he says, "you're going to run this thing, Ailian, so carry on."

Well, Ailian Dulles, in his usual magnanimous fashion, said to the assemblage, "Now, we know there's been extensive discussion to this point, but I'd like to offer the military the option of providing a deputy director to the center, so you could be completely privy to everything from the budget to all the operations that are going on, and look at it as part of your activities and not solely our domain."

That, of course, was just great. And a great debate immediately began as to which service would provide the deputy director. It couldn't be solved right at that moment, so there were other meetings that came forth, and they had to choose somebody from say the Marine Corps ^{like Gen. Graves Erskine} who was not involved, who had more stars than anybody else, four, ~~four~~ to listen to the testimony from the four sides, and he made the decision then, on the basis of what he heard, that the Army had been the strongest initial supporter of the center,

so the Army should provide the first deputy, but it should rotate amongst the three services.

A National Security Council directive was issued making a national center, and now we were going to have a military deputy director from the Army and it was going to rotate amongst the three services, and my contemporaries at CIA were concerned at this moment in history that somebody that would outrank me would be drawn forth from the structure of the United States government and superimposed on the center as the leader.

So I, at that moment in history, was a GS-16, was almost overnight, they promoted me to a GS-18, literally walking the papers, so it shows how fast it can be done when they have to, to make sure that there was not some sleeper GS-18 somewhere that was going to be drummed out and brought over and superimposed. ^{and}

So that was the biggest and the fastest and the most lucrative promotion I ever had while I worked for the government. I'm now GS-18 and I got a military deputy whose name was David Stewart Parker, and we are looking for another place in which to work, because these distinguished people who had come to the Steuart Building, not only Mr. McNamara and his entourage, but the President's foreign intelligence advisory board -- I think they call it PFIAB -- they came there, and they were ^{aw}estruck by the primitive condition of not only our neighborhood, our building, eating, parking, airconditioning, the whole gamut of logistics. So they went back and President Kennedy ^{who} is now in the White House; they recommend to him that he get us out of there as